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H. Patrick Wells*  A Leap of Faith:  TWAIL Meets Caribbean
 Queer Rights Jurisprudence—Intersections
 with International Human Rights Law
This article examines the legal status of queer rights in Caribbean jurisprudence. 
It conducts an analysis of Caribbean queer rights case law, in order to arrive at 
an understanding of the extent and dynamics of constitutional protection for these 
rights. It then uses the revelations from this analysis to determine how Caribbean 
queer rights jurisprudence has intersected with international human rights norms, 
values and rules. Finally, the article applies the TWAIL methodological approach 
to international law to argue that the Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence has not 
so far reflected the counter-hegemonic, resistance, anti-imperialist discourse that 
TWAIL champions, in spite of the socio-cultural and political Caribbean realities 
of homophobia. This homophobia mirrors some of the key conceptual notions 
and impulses of the TWAIL critique of international human rights law. I further 
argue that TWAIL, in spite of a number of its concerns about some of the norms 
and values found in international human rights law, including those related to 
gay rights, can nevertheless accommodate equality-seeking queer rights/human 
rights, if the core assumption is that queer rights ultimately are about the rule 
of law and democracy. I conclude that even though Caribbean courts are at an 
infancy in their reach to protect queer rights on the premise of international human 
rights norms, they have nevertheless certainly taken a leap of faith on an equality-
preserving trajectory.
Dans le présent article, nous examinons le statut juridique des droits des 
personnes gaies dans la jurisprudence des pays des Caraïbes. Nous analysons 
cette jurisprudence afin de comprendre l’étendue et la dynamique de la protection 
constitutionnelle de ces droits dans ces pays. Nous utilisons ensuite les données 
tirées de cette analyse pour examiner les rapports entre cette jurisprudence et les 
normes, valeurs et règles internationales en matière de droits de la personne. Enfin, 
nous appliquons l’approche méthodologique utilisée par le mouvement TWAIL 
(Third World Approaches to International Law) pour soutenir que la jurisprudence 
relative aux droits des personnes gaies dans les pays des Caraïbes n’a pas 
jusqu’ici tenu compte du discours anti-hégémonique et anti-impérialiste que le 
mouvement TWAIL défend, malgré les réalités socioculturelles et politiques de 
l’homophobie qui existe dans les Caraïbes. Cette homophobie reflète certaines 
des principales notions au cœur de la critique du droit international en matière de 
droits de l’homme effectuée par TWAIL. Je soutiens en outre que TWAIL, malgré 
plusieurs de ses préoccupations au sujet de certaines normes et valeurs du droit 
international en matière de droits de la personne, y compris celles liées aux droits 
des personnes gaies, peut néanmoins accommoder les droits de ces personnes 
qui revendiquent l’égalité, si l’hypothèse de base est que leurs droits reviennent 
en fin de compte à une question de primauté du droit et de démocratie. Je 
conclus que même si les tribunaux dans les pays des Caraïbes n’en sont qu’à 
leurs premiers pas dans la protection des droits des personnes gaies sur la base 
des normes internationales des droits de la personne, ils ont néanmoins fait un 
acte de foi en faveur de la préservation de l’égalité.
* BA, MSc (Pol Sci), MSc (Soc), LLB, LLM., Attorney-at-law, Ontario, Canada. My deepest 
gratitude to Professor Elizabeth F Judge, for all her assistance.
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Introduction
This article is about queer rights jurisprudence in the context of the 
Caribbean polity. This area of the law in the Caribbean is at an infancy 
stage. In this article, I have three key objectives. My first objective 
is to conduct an analysis of the small body of Caribbean queer rights 
jurisprudence in order to arrive at an understanding of the extent of 
constitutional protection that has fermented for these rights in the region. 
My second objective is to assess the degree to which the protections for 
queer rights found in the jurisprudence reflect international human rights 
law norms and values. My third is to frame an argument that, despite a 
strong social and cultural opposition in the Caribbean to what are described 
as Eurocentric international queer rights norms, values and legal principles 
embodied in international human rights law, courts in the Caribbean have 
been taking a tentative leap of faith into that world, demonstrating a 
degree of willingness to embrace such norms and values. The courts have 
been gently repudiating typical Caribbean/Third World objections and 
opposition to “normalizing” those international norms and values, which 
is a scepticism shared by the Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) narrative. 
This article makes four contributions: (i) it formulates and articulates 
a narrative and an understanding of how Caribbean courts think about 
matters of queer rights’ protection in the context of regional/domestic 
socio-cultural norms; (ii) it explores the intersection of Caribbean 
queer rights jurisprudence with international human rights law; (iii) it 
interrogates the neo-colonial, counter-hegemonic narrative about queer 
rights that is typical in Caribbean society and which is a partial reflection 
of the skepticism towards international human rights law found broadly 
in TWAIL; and (iv) it explores the potential for finding common ground 
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between the Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence and TWAIL, on the 
basis of shared ideologies grounded in the rule of law and democracy.
Following this Introduction, Part I sets out an overview of the 
approaches to queer rights in Caribbean societies. Generally, there is a 
strong cultural resistance to the flourishing of queer rights in the region. 
In many instances, this resistance is visceral, leading on several occasions 
to the use of violence against persons who openly present in ways that are 
alleged or perceived to be queer by the public at large. This attitude projects 
a kind of refutation of what is deemed to be a normalization of queer rights. 
Typically, the antipathy that is demonstrated is contextualized in cultural 
or religious terms and is aimed at articulating what is considered to be a 
rejection of “illegitimate” international trends on sexual “permissiveness.” 
Part II of the article briefly explains and discusses the methodological 
framework of TWAIL. This Part highlights the ethical and intellectual 
struggles engaged by TWAIL scholars, in exposing and reforming those 
parts of international law that are said to reinforce inequality, unfairness 
and unjustness in the global order. As a methodological approach, TWAIL 
points to the “heaven/hell binary” that it claims stands in the way of the 
cross-fertilization of ideas and perspectives in international law generally, 
and in international human rights law in particular. This binary, according 
to TWAIL, casts the First World as “heaven” and the Third World as “hell,” 
relative to the protection of norms and values that epitomize a respect for 
human rights.  This results in a kind of dynamic where the “Western gaze” 
on the so-called human rights records of Third World states stigmatizes 
rather than respects. This, ultimately, in the view of TWAILers, challenges 
the legitimacy of the statehood and governance of these Third World 
states without giving due regard to the full cycle of historical exploitation 
and abuse that produced and feeds these cycles of alleged human rights 
violations, thereby “elitizing” international law. 
Part III analyzes the current body of Caribbean queer rights 
jurisprudence. The cases presented are from the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(a regional court), and from the high (superior) and appellate courts in 
individual territories: Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, and Belize. The 
core subject matters arising in these cases are sexual intimacy in the form 
of “buggery,” same-sex marriage, immigration and cross-dressing. While 
these headings do not cover the widest gambit of all potential litigation 
that could arise on queer rights in the region, the trajectory of litigating 
queer rights in the Caribbean is at an early stage, and  there is the potential 
for far greater litigation. 
Part IV argues that Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence, for the 
most part, reflects a trend towards accepting international human rights 
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law norms and values. This trend is demonstrated in the repeated reliance 
on principles and opinions from international human rights tribunals 
or decision-making bodies, as well as from domestic courts in other 
jurisdictions such as Canada, India, and South Africa. The decisions 
examined in this Part of the article also reflect a trend to associate 
Caribbean constitutional and human rights provisions with the wider 
norms of international human rights protection, by making linkages and 
highlighting similarities and equivalences in international human rights 
instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In this way the courts 
appear to be locating their vindication of queer rights in the wider spectrum 
of international human rights law, rather than in cloistered, cultural, and 
localized expectations and norms. This section of the article also argues 
that Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence appears to disempower the hard 
core notions of counter-hegemony and resistance to neo-colonial human 
rights norms found in TWAIL scholarship, in favour of finding a more 
nuanced “made in the Caribbean” implementation of international human 
rights norms. Further, the section assesses whether queer rights equality-
seeking interests in the Caribbean can be accommodated within the TWAIL 
regime of ideas at all. The view this article takes, in this regard, is that an 
accommodation is possible, considering that in seeking to protect queer 
rights, the core goals of the courts are the upholding of the rule of law 
and the protection of democratic values. This is certainly not unlike what 
Third World states, as a whole, seek as well. The protection of queer rights 
should, therefore, be viewed not through the prism of cultural invasion and 
Western penetration, but instead through the prism of such considerations 
as equality before the law, respect for personal autonomy and human 
dignity, and respect for free agency and expression—considerations that 
coherently preserve the rule of law and democracy. Part V offers a brief 
conclusion. 
Ultimately, what this article aims to show is that instead of a blanket 
rejection or unqualified embrace of international human rights norms, 
values and laws on queer rights, or an outright rejection of the socio-
cultural realities of homophobia in the Caribbean region, the courts are 
engaged in  a slow, delicate manoeuvre, aimed at persuading reasonable 
minds, through clinical reasoning and the assertion of a kind of judicial 
authority of “rightness” and fairness that they hope will resonate. In other 
words, the courts are not appearing to judge Caribbean norms and values, 
which in their view are counter-intuitive to wider norms of respect for and 
preservation of human dignity, but are instead engaging in a process that 
I would call legalistic “proclaiming and rationalizing,” hoping that their 
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judicial proclamations and rationalizations gradually receive institutional, 
political and social approbation.
As this article shows, Caribbean courts are thoroughly open to 
applying settled legal human rights principles to queer human rights, not 
only from the regional diaspora but also from the proverbial “imperialist,” 
“neo-colonialist” sphere. On repeated occasions, judgments from Canada, 
Australia, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) are considered favourably and are used as critical guides 
to the resolutions arrived at in the local cases. There is also an evident 
reliance on international human rights instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
 I. Approaches to queer rights in Caribbean societies
Although things have been lethargically changing within the last few 
years, historically, there has been a visceral opposition to the advancement 
of queer rights in the broad socio-cultural dynamic of Caribbean societies. 
According to Holness, “the Caribbean’s apprehension to Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex (LGBTI) rights advocacy is deeply rooted 
in the region’s tragically oppressive colonial experience.”1 As such, many 
persons in the Caribbean view the “attempt by the West toward more 
tolerance for the gay community as post-colonial imperialism,”2 a view 
consistent with Massad’s that the global “same-sex” rights movement 
is a neo-colonial/Western enterprise.3 In a 2013 article dealing with the 
promulgation of the Cayman Islands Constitution in 2009, Vlcek captures 
poignantly the broad strokes of Caribbean animus to queer rights. He 
claimed that the citizens in that Caribbean territory viewed the Bill of 
Rights in the proposed Constitution at the time as “a form of subterfuge 
intended to force this ostensibly global norm for sexual preference on 
them”4 by the government of the United Kingdom (the Cayman Islands 
1. Toni Holness, “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Rights in the Caribbean: Using 
Regional Bodies to Advance Culturally Charged Rights” (2013) 38:3 Brook J Intl L 925 at 926. 
(Holness notes that for his article, “The acronym LGBTI is used…to include other variations of the 
acronym, such as, LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer/Questioning), and other sexual 
minorities.” In this article, I adopt a similar position, but will use “gay rights” and “queer rights” 
interchangeably as well to reference all sexual minorities as a whole).
2. Charlene L Smith & Ryan Kosobucki, “Homophobia in the Caribbean” (2011) 1 J L & Soc 
Deviance 1 at 32.
3. Joseph Massad, “Re-orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World” (2002) 14:2 
Public Culture 361.
4. William Vlcek, “Crafting Human Rights in a Constitution: Gay Rights in the Cayman Islands 
and the Limits to Global Norm Diffusion” (2013) 2:3 Global Constitutionalism 345 at 346.
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being a British Overseas Territory). Vlcek describes this “subterfuge” as 
the introduction of a norm, not through ‘socialization, institutionalization, 
and demonstration,” as the means of incorporating queer rights, but 
rather through a process of “norm cascade” or direct imposition through 
“dominant mechanisms,”5 representing a forced transfer of “modern” 
norms as a potential example of “imperialist/neo-colonial modernization.”6
Vleck’s narrative reflects the core underpinnings of the approach 
taken by international human rights cultural imperialism scholars such 
as Mutua, who writes of the “damning metaphor” of “Savages-Victims-
Saviors,” which, he argues, fuels the current human rights paradigm.7 
Mutua argues that human rights rhetoric encamps governments into either 
the good or the “evil” state, with the “evil” state, typically Third World in 
definition, being deemed by the good state to be one that expresses itself 
“through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture” that 
works as the “operational instrument of savagery” when deviation from 
Western cultural expectations occurs.8 Mutua elaborates in this way:
The simple, yet complex promise of the savior is freedom: freedom 
from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the 
freedom to create a better society based on particular values. In the 
human rights story, the savior is the human rights corpus itself, with the 
United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities as 
the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted world. In reality, however, 
these institutions are merely fronts. The savior is ultimately a set of 
culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and 
philosophy.9
Mutua’s approach is, therefore, a scholarly representation of the views 
of wide sectors of Caribbean societies, which criticize international human 
rights movements as characteristically Eurocentric. Those in Caribbean 
societies that hold this view largely also reflect the position taken by 
Mutua that these “Eurocentric” international human rights movements 
are seeking to shame other cultures as being the “savage” that is inferior 
and which is operating extra-normatively of Western cultural norms. This 
theoretical framework has been adopted in other parts of the literature by 
scholars such as McKinley, who, in relation to asylum claims, for example, 
asserts that the international human rights paradigm demonstrates “the 
5. Ibid at 347.
6. Ibid at 368.
7. Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights” (2001) 42 Harv 
Intl LJ 201 at 214-217 [Mutua, “Metaphor”].
8. Ibid at 203.
9. Ibid at 204. 
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paradigmatic example of post-colonial rescue and the contemporary 
extension of the maternal imperialist project.”10 
This embroidery of views on the culturally imperialistic essence of 
international human rights law, particularly in relation to queer rights, in 
large measure contextualizes why homophobia in the Caribbean region11 
has sometimes been a part of not only the legal politic, but also of the 
expressive culture, such as in music.12 This homophobia has also been 
commonly characterized by virulent incidents of public resentment, and has 
often been articulated through collective violence against queer persons.13 
The murder of 16 year-old Dwayne Jones, a cross-dressing teenager, by 
a mob in July 2013 in Montego-Bay, Jamaica, is a tragic illustration of 
such violence. As pointed out by Human Rights Watch at the time of this 
incident relative to attitudes in the Jamaican society at the time:
If someone does not conform to gender expectations…they face 
widespread verbal and physical abuse that can range from beatings 
to armed attacks to murder…They are often driven from their homes 
and communities. The Jamaican government has a poor record of 
investigating and holding to account those who commit violence because 
of the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Some individuals 
have sought to justify Jones’ killing with comments in mainstream or 
social media that he provoked the attack by ‘bringing his behavior into 
the public.’14
Even in political circles, leadership in Jamaica has displayed a similar 
resistance to the normalization of queer rights,15 and commensurately, 
10. Michelle A McKinley, “Cultural Culprits” (2009) 24 Berkeley J Gender Law & Just 91 at 103. 
11. See generally David McFadden, “Gays Live—and die—in fear in Jamaica” Associated Press 
(20 July 2009), online: <http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-cb-jamaica-gay-bashing-
071909-2009jul19-story.html> [https://perma.cc/UL5G-4YJB]; Smith & Kosobucki, supra note 2; 
Robert Carr, “On ‘Judgments’: Poverty, Sexuality-Based Violence and Human Rights in 21st Century 
Jamaica” (2003) 2 Caribbean J Social Work 71; Tim Padgett, “The Most Homophobic Place on Earth” 
(12 April 2006) Time.com, online: <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1182991,00.
html> [https://perma.cc/H7ND-7DPC]
12. Camille A Nelson, “Lyrical Assault: Dancehall versus the Cultural Imperialism of the North-
West” (2008) 17 S Cal Interdisciplinary LJ 231.
13. See generally Human Rights Watch, “This Alien Legacy: The Origins of ‘Sodomy’ Laws in 
British Colonialism” (2008), online: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/12/17/alien-legacy/origins-
sodomy-laws-british-colonialism> [https://perma.cc/9DGW-S7S9]  
14. “Jamaica: Cross-Dressing Teenager Murdered Investigate, Condemn Violence, Respect 
Rights of LGBT People” Human Rights Watch (1 August 2013), online:  <https://www.hrw.org/
news/2013/08/01/jamaica-cross-dressing-teenager-murdered> [https://perma.cc/HW9P-QLD3] 
15. Nicholas Laughlin, “Jamaica, Caribbean: No Gays in Golding’s Government” Global Voices 
(23 May 2008), online: <https://globalvoices.org/2008/05/23/jamaica-caribbean-no-gays-in-goldings-
government> [https://perma.cc/5BEE-WXBM]; Athaliah Reynolds-Baker, Not in my Cabinet: 
Representations of Gay People in the Jamaican Print Media (MA Thesis, University of Leicester, 
October 2014) [unpublished].
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where that leadership has expressed or hinted at any openness or 
willingness to accommodate reasoned discussion on the matter, there is 
an oppositional reaction from the general public and from other political 
figures. In 2011 during the general election debate in Jamaica, when one 
candidate for prime minister, Portia Simpson Miller, indicated that she 
would not have a policy banning homosexuals from serving in her cabinet 
were she to become the prime minister (as one former prime minister had 
said he would), the energy minister at the time, Clive Mullings, warned that 
“God [had] brought down fire and brimstone on Sodom and Gomorrah.”16
All of this is part of the fabric of resistance to the international 
human rights approach to queer rights and largely reflects the melody 
of the culturally conservative approach to these rights in the Caribbean. 
As one advocate of this resistance notes, there has been a “centrality and 
manipulation of sexuality and sexual rights in struggles for and against the 
civilizing mission that lies at the heart of key aspects of globalization.”17 This 
is essentially a questioning of the democratic legitimacy of international 
human rights law.18 It is no wonder, therefore, that the creation of the 
Caribbean Court of Justice, a regional court, was seen as marking “the 
closing of a circle on independence” and the “sunset of British colonial 
rule.”19 This contextualizes the view that because of the Caribbean’s 
“shared socio-cultural characteristics,” consensus on the way forward 
should emerge from regional norms rather than from external imposition 
or transplantation of gay rights advocacy.20 As this paper reveals in Parts 
III and IV, however, the courts in the Caribbean now do not appear to share 
this view and are entirely inclined to formulate an approach to queer rights 
validation that is largely and meaningfully informed by what is happening 
and has happened on the wider international human rights scene. In fact, 
one of the most positively transformative decisions that is examined in 
this article emerged from the Caribbean Court of Justice and addressed 
a subject matter that many would perhaps view as an entirely Caribbean 
anathema: cross-dressing among queer men in public spaces.
16. The Economist, “Go Sista—Sodom and Mrs. Simpson Miller,” The Economist Group Limited 
(London, 7 January 2012), online: <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2012/01/07/go-sista> 
[https://perma.cc/R67F-WXTT] (Mrs. Simpson-Miller was affectionately referred to by the population 
as “Sista P,” an abbreviated reference to her first name, “Portia,” hence the title “Go Sista…”)
17. Katherine Franke, “Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights” (2012) 44:1 
Colum HR LR 1 at 2.
18. See generally Douglas Leo Donoho, “Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of 
International Decision-Making” (2003) 21 Wis Intl LJ 1.
19. See generally Leonard Birdsong, “Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Sunset of 
British Colonial Rule in the English-Speaking Caribbean” (2005) 36 U Miami Inter-American L Rev 
197. 
20. Holness, supra note 1 at 945.
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Against the background of this framework and narrative of “cultural 
resistance,” it, therefore, becomes apposite to analyse and understand the 
degree to which the coalescing of international human rights norms, values 
and expectations around an expanding body of rules in the international 
arena has influenced the way in which queer rights protections are evolving 
in the Caribbean. Before conducting this analysis, I situate the TWAIL 
narrative in international human rights law, in order to provide context to 
the arguments to be made in Part IV.
II. Theoretical framework—third world approaches to international law 
(TWAIL)
So far in the region, the cases that have emerged on the protection of queer 
rights as human rights suggest a tentative drift towards a general embrace 
of international human rights trends. This portends a tension between the 
TWAIL approach to international human rights norms and the overall 
direction of Caribbean Courts on queer rights. 
The pith and substance of the TWAIL perspective is an opposition 
to what is perceived as the broadly unequal, unfair and unjust nature of 
international law rules that very often, though not always, reinforce Third 
World domination and subordination.21  One of the things that undoubtedly 
unites TWAIL scholars is their opposition to a politics that is grounded in 
the notion of the “empire” versus others.22 As described by al Attar et al:
TWAIL is an alternative narrative of international law that has developed 
in opposition to the realities of domination and subordination prevalent 
in the international legal apparatus. A fundamentally counter-hegemonic 
movement, TWAIL is united in its rejection of what its champions regard 
as an unjust relationship between the Third World and international law.23
Similarly, Eslava et al explain that:
Although there is arguably no single theoretical approach which unites 
TWAIL scholars, they share both a sensibility, and a political orientation. 
TWAIL is therefore ... defined by a commonality of concerns. Those 
concerns centre around attempting to attune the operation of International 
law to those sites and subjects that have traditionally been positioned as 
the ‘others of international law.’24
21. See generally Obiora C Okafor, “Marxian Embraces (and De-Couplings) in Upendra Baxi’s 
Human Rights Scholarship: A Case Study” in Susan Marks ed, International Law on the Left: Re-
Examining the Marxist Legacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 252 [“Marxian”].
22. See generally BS Chimni, “The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third 
World Approach” (2007) 8:2 Melbourne J Intl L 499.
23. Mohsen al Attar and Rebekah Thompson, “How the Multi-Level Democratisation of International 
Law-Making Can Effect Popular Aspirations Towards Self-Determination” (2011) 3:1 Trade Law & 
Development 65 at 67.
24. Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, “Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality 
of International Law” (2011) 3:1 Trade Law & Development 103 at 104. 
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As a result of this positioning, TWAIL scholars are “solidly united to a 
shared ethical commitment to the intellectual and practical struggle to 
expose, reform, or even retrench those features of the international legal 
system that help to create or maintain the generally unequal, unfair, or 
unjust global order…taking the lives and experiences of…[the] Third 
World much more seriously than has generally been the case.”25 In this 
context, the act of exposing the colonial features and structural framework 
of international law is considered to be fundamental to understanding 
the current international legal order.26 In this sense, TWAIL is, therefore, 
almost certainly a part of the fabric of critical internationalism.27 
In relation to international human rights law specifically, TWAIL 
scholars have consistently articulated a series of concerns that have been 
discussed in many parts of the literature. As presented by Okafor, these 
include the “heaven/hell binary,” the “one-way traffic paradigm,” the 
“orientation of the Western gaze,” “stigmatization of the Third World,” and 
the “conceptual economy of appearances.”28 Okafor’s initial argument is 
that current international human rights law operates from the dichotomous 
paradigm of the “heavenly” versus the “hellish.” In this paradigm, the 
West is deemed to be good, while the Third World is consistently type-cast 
as bad.29 What emerges in this scenario, in Okafor’s view, is a monologue 
flowing from the “West” to the rest. Instead of a dialogue that can ultimately 
forge a kind of “mass cultural legitimacy” in international human rights 
law, there is a dynamic of alienation. This binary, concludes Okafor, is “at 
best, arrogance, and at worst, disingenuous.”30 It contributes to the tenuous 
attraction of certain international human rights norms in some parts of 
the Third World.31 The reality, argues Okafor, presents a certain irony, as 
25. Obiora C Okafor, “Newness, Imperialism and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A 
TWAIL Perspective” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171 at 176 [Okafor, “Newness”]. 
26. Antony Anghie, “Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, 
and the Third World” (2000) 32 NYU J Intl L & Pol 243 at 245-246 [Anghie, “Globalization”].
27. Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 
31 at 31.
28. Obiora C Okafor, “International Human Rights Fact-Finding Praxis in its Living Forms: A TWAIL 
Perspective” (2014) 1 Transnational Human Rights Review 59 at 66-67 [Okafor, “International”].
29. See generally OC Okafor & SC Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining International Human Rights Education 
in Our Time: Beyond Three Constitutive Orthodoxies” (2001) 14 Leiden J Intl L 563 [Okafor & 
Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining”]; Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7; Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human 
Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 4 [Baxi, “Future of Human Rights”]; Upendra Baxi, 
“‘A Work in Progress?’: The United States’ Report to the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee” 
(1995) 35 Indian J Intl L 34 [Baxi, “Work in Progress”]; Upendra Baxi, “Random Reflections on the 
[Im]possibilityof Human Rights,” online: <https://www.pdhre.org/dialogue/reflections.html> [https://
perma.cc/2CRD-3PME] [Baxi, “Random Reflections”].   
30. Okafor & Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining,” ibid at 574.
31. See e.g. CA Odinkalu, “Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language” (2000) 2:1 
Human Rights Dialogue 3 at 3-4.
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even in Western societies there are obvious contradictions in the extent 
to which countries adhere to human rights.32 The ultimate challenge, as 
Okafor sees it, is, therefore, that this binary projects an absolutism that 
stands in the way of perfectly legitimate cross-fertilization of human rights 
ideas and perspectives, across the North South global divide. The crux 
of the critique is that this is untenable, as there exists no place that is 
so “heavenly” that it repudiates any possibility of questioning, criticism, 
revision or enlargement, considering that those things that are determined 
to be human rights emerge from some social, political or economic force. 
Scholars such as Mutua have strongly argued this perspective.33 
The result, argue TWAIL scholars, is the one-way flow of what is 
considered good and bad in international human rights law. This one-way 
flow, says Okafor, derives “a logical end product of a conceptualization 
of human rights…as a one-way traffic paradigm in which human rights 
knowledge, scrutiny and supervision tends to flow from…the West, which 
supposedly invented human rights…in the direction of those regions of 
the world…which apparently did not invent human rights.”34 One of the 
most apparent consequences of this intellectual mirage, argues Okafor, is 
that it reinforces and systematizes a “racialized hierarchy in Third World 
societies,” making these societies the perennial subjects of human rights 
investigations, condemnations and allegations of human rights violations. 
This, according to Marsh et al, flows from the fact that: 
What we today call “universal human rights” are to a great extent the 
product of Western societies…[These rights] emerged from a particularly 
Western historical context and [were] influenced by a number of Western 
contingencies, none of which are likely to be reproduced in other parts of 
the world. [Nevertheless]…the…articulation of these ideas bears little or 
no relation to their acceptance by other cultures.35
32. EK Quashigah & Obiora C Okafor, “Toward the Enhancement of the Relevance and Effectiveness 
of the Movement for the Securement of Legitimate Governance in Africa” in E.K. Quashigah & OC 
Okafor, eds, Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 539 at 553. See also Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7 at 211.
33. See e.g. Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7 at 217; Makau Mutua, “The Ideology of Human 
Rights” (1996) 36 Va J Intl L 589 [Mutua, “Ideology”]; Antony Anghie, “Francisco de Vitoria 
and the Colonial Origins of International Law” (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 321; and 
P Hountondji, “The Master’s Voice—Remarks on the Problem of Human Rights in Africa” in 
UNESCO, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights 319 at 320-332 (Paris: UNESCO, 1986).
34. Okafor, “International,” supra note 28 at 72; See also Baxi, “Future of Human Rights,” supra 
note 29 at 4; Baxi, “Work in Progress,” supra note 29; Baxi, “Random Reflections,” supra note 29.  
35. Christopher Marsh & Daniel P Payne, “The Globalization of Human Rights and the Socialization 
of Human Rights Norms,” (2007) BYU L Rev 665 at 671. 
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This, as some scholars see it, results in a situation where global human 
rights juggernauts devote their human rights activism towards the Third 
World,36 with very little focus on the First/Western/Northern World.37
TWAIL scholars point out that the “heaven” and “hell” binary and 
the resultant one-way flow of international human rights norms causes 
a consistent gaze on the Third World by the West, stigmatizing those 
parts of the world as the problem spots. This gaze reinforces questioning 
and challenging of the legitimacy of Third World statehood, governance 
and practices.38 Because of this, whenever any action or series of actions 
is identified by the West as a violation of human rights in these Third 
World states, condemnation heaps upon them, as “[w]hatever the Western 
eye recognizes as a violation of human rights tends to become widely 
recognized as such, and whoever the Western eye sees as a pariah, as the 
‘bad guy,’ tends to become widely viewed as such…”39 It is this state of 
affairs that causes mainstream international human rights discourse to treat 
Third World culture as retrograde to Western human rights norms, notions 
and values.40 In this way, Third World culture is stigmatized as almost 
always violative of human rights, as if human rights are culture-free.41
Separate and apart from this diminution of Third World cultures as part 
of the fabric of the inculcation of Western/First World international human 
rights norms, TWAIL scholars also argue that there is the production 
of what is referred to as a “conceptual economy of appearances.” In 
explaining this concept, Okafor indicates that it is where a: 
36. See J Smith & R Pagnucco, “Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human 
Rights NGOs in the 1990s” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 379 at 386.
37. Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7 at 216-217.
38. See Obiora C Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State 
Fragmentation in Africa, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000) [Okafor, “Legitimate Statehood”]; 
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) [Anghie, “Imperialism”]; Makau Mutua, “The Banjul Charter and 
the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties” (1995) 35 Va J Intl L 339 
[Mutua, “Banjul Charter”].
39. Okafor, “International,” supra note 28 at 76.
40. See C Nyanio, “How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization 
of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries” (2000) 41 Harv Intl LJ 381; Mutua, “Banjul Charter,” 
supra note 38; Obiora C Okafor, “Attainments, Eclipses and Disciplinary Renewal-in International 
Human Rights Law: A Critical Overview” in D Armstrong, ed, Routledge Handbook of International 
Law (London: Routledge, 2009) at 307 [Okafor, “Attainments”]; and A Riles, “Anthropology, Human 
Rights and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage” (2004) 15 Finnish Yearbook of Intl L 9.
41. See D Bell, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); AA An’im, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); J Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of 
Human Rights” (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281; PT Zeleza, “The Struggle for Human Rights 
in Africa” in PT Zeleza & PJ McConnaughay, eds, Human Rights, The Rule of Law, and Development 
in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
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person, group, or country is featured as a culprit (or human rights violator) 
without necessarily fingering the full cycle of consumption, exploitation, 
abuse, and so on, that fed or feed the chain of events that ultimately 
produced the violation…[ignoring] the lack of in-depth knowledge 
of the history and context that frame [the problem]… impos[ing] a 
problematic or even harmful conceptual economy of appearances that 
decontextualizes and therefore distorts…the situation…42
The way in which this impacts the international human rights discourse, 
according to TWAIL scholars, is that trumpeted human rights violations 
identified by the “saviours” of the West are not viewed through the prisms 
of wider economic facts and histories that give cause and context to these 
“violations,” but instead are denoted as failings solely of the governments 
and institutions of these “violating” Third World states. In other words, this 
is a wilful blindness to the antecedent conduct of hegemonic imposition 
and manipulation of Third World socio-political and socio-economic 
realities—impositions and manipulations that in turn give rise to some of 
the very failings of the Third World states which are ultimately condemned 
by these hegemonic states and actors. The “saviours” thereby ignore the 
element of the “capture” by Western hegemons. As summarized by Eslava 
et al., “[t]he most significant point of departure of TWAIL from what might 
loosely be called ‘mainstream’ interpretations of international law, is in 
TWAIL’s insistence that issues of material distribution and imbalances of 
power affect the way in which international legal concepts, categories, 
norms and doctrines are produced and understood.” 43
It is these notions of normativity and universalism in international 
human rights law that TWAIL sets out to resist,44 accordingly “de-elitizing” 
international law.45 As Rajagopal points out, in spite of how much human 
rights has become entangled in a discourse of “military intervention, 
economic reconstruction and social transformation,” it is nevertheless 
still “legitimate to use international law as an explicit counter hegemonic 
tool of resistance.”46 As he sees it, there is clearly room for human rights 
discourse to be influenced by “counter-hegemonic struggles across a range 
42. Okafor, “International,” supra note 28 at 81.
43. Eslava & Pahuja, supra note 24 at 105.  
44. John D Haskell, “TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches to 
International Law” (2014) 27 Can JL & Jurisprudenc 383 at 399.
45. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and 
Third World Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)at 292.
46. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights 
and Development as a Third World Strategy” (2006) 27:5 Third World Quarterly 767 at 770 and 772 
[Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic”].
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of areas.”47 In other words, TWAILers must speak “truth to power.”48 
Importantly however, it is necessary to point that:
…the argument is not necessarily that the human rights conditions in the 
Third World are either ideal or even at par with the situation in Western 
states. We do recognize that there is a hellish dimension to the lives of 
the majority of the inhabitants of the Third World. However, we also 
recognize the fact that such hellish conditions are not absolute. Third 
World states are hells and heavens to varying extents, depending on 
whom you ask. So are Western states.49
Conceptually, this “resistance,” anti-imperialism construct which is 
characteristic of TWAIL is a useful approach to the analysis in this article, 
bearing in mind the matters raised in Part I about Caribbean realities 
and attitudes towards queer rights. It is this resentment towards what is 
perceived as imperialist cultural and legal penetration that is articulated, 
for instance, in the popular and expressive culture of some Caribbean 
countries as mentioned in Part I, and which will help to determine the 
extent to which this perception of the “invasion” of international human 
rights law norms, in respect of the protection of queer rights, has impacted 
Caribbean jurisprudence. This jurisprudence will now be examined.
III. Queer rights and human rights in Commonwealth Caribbean 
jurisprudence—intersections with international human rights law
The key subjects of Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence are sexual 
intimacy in the form of “buggery,” immigration, same-sex marriage, and 
cross-dressing. These issues emerge from a study of six cases and concern 
the fundamental human rights of privacy, free expression, freedom from 
non-discrimination, equality before the law, and equal protection by the 
law. What the cases show is that Caribbean courts are on a path of advancing 
queer rights through their jurisprudence and that this advancement has 
trended towards an acceptance and reflection of international human 
rights norms, values and rules. The courts in these cases demonstrate this 
bent by observing and relying on jurisprudence not only from overseas 
(“First World”) jurisdictions and international courts and tribunals, but 
also by exercising a conscious and deliberate embrace of international law 
treaties and instruments, as part of the praxis of crafting their judgments. 
Likewise, there are consistent references to and acknowledgements of 
the foundational bases of several of the Constitutions of the region on 
international human rights law instruments, such as the UDHR, the 
47. Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic,” ibid at 772.
48. Michael Fakhri, “Questioning TWAIL’s Agenda” (2012) 14 Or Rev Intl L 1 at 11. 
49. Okafor & Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining,” supra note 29 at 572.
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ICCPR, and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, 
either in whole or in part. All of this leads to the conclusion that, based on 
the evidence from the case law, the courts are breaking new ground in the 
Caribbean, by relying on international human rights norms to protect, at 
least to some degree, the human rights litigated by the queer applicants. 
The only exception is the Tomlinson case, but as I argue below, the decision 
in that case was simply wrong. In spite of this singular digression, the 
evidence nevertheless demonstrates an obvious trajectory in the protection 
of queer rights by Caribbean courts. 
It is important to note, however, that this path that the courts are 
on is not yet to be viewed as a revolutionary, “full speed ahead” “guns 
blazing” march which relegates Caribbean reservations and socio-cultural 
reluctances to jurisprudential oblivion. This is made clear in Orozco50 for 
instance, where the Court stated that “it needs to be made pellucid that [the] 
claim [stood] to be decided on the provisions of the Belize Constitution, 
and in [that] regard, the court [stood] aloof from adjudicating on any moral 
issue.”51
On the evidence that I will provide below, it is therefore arguable that 
the courts, in determining queer rights matters in the context of wider 
international human rights norms and values, are not acting consistent with 
the wider negative and less than conciliatory attitudes that are prevalent in 
the region on these issues. Recalling, for example, the apprehension in the 
Caribbean to queer rights advocacy addressed by Holness, it appears from 
the discussion below that the courts do not share such an “apprehension” 
in the judicial posture that they have adopted.  To the contrary, what seems 
to be occurring instead is a judicial intellectualizing by the courts, which 
assumes a sort of openness and willingness to consider the “newness” of 
ideas and “freshness” of approaches to the phenomenon of queer rights in 
the region. To a certain degree, this also represents a new dialectic where 
decisions are being made not on account of the common perceptions and 
expectations regarding queer persons and the features of queer existence 
in the Caribbean, but rather in spite of the same.  This new dispensation 
projects an aura of judicial self-confidence and independence that is 
50. Orozco v Attorney General, infra note 66 at para 53.
51. The court in Jones v Attorney General also made a similar point when it said, “This conclusion 
is not an assessment or denial of the religious beliefs of anyone. This court is not qualified to do so. 
However, this conclusion is a recognition that the beliefs of some, by definition, is not the belief of all 
and, in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, all are protected, and are entitled to be protected, under 
the Constitution. As a result, this court must and will uphold the Constitution to recognize the dignity 
of even one citizen whose rights and freedoms have been invalidly taken away” (infra note 52 at para 
174). 
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noteworthy, as it features a palpable dissonance between what the majority 
of the people in the Caribbean would expect from the courts on the one 
hand and where the courts appear to want to shift the queer rights/human 
rights compass, on the other hand. 
In the first case, Jones v Attorney General,52 the High Court of Trinidad 
and Tobago dealt with the criminal offences of “buggery” and serious 
indecency under sections 13 and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act, respectively. 
Section 13 criminalized “sexual intercourse per anum by a male person 
with a male person or by a male person with a female person,”53 while 
section 16 outlawed “[any] act, other than sexual intercourse...involving 
the use of the genital organ for the purpose of arousing or gratifying 
sexual desire.”54 The claimant’s complaint was that both provisions were 
“unconstitutional, illegal, null, void, invalid and...of no effect to the extent 
that [they criminalized]...consensual sexual conduct between adults.” 
According to Jones, the rights affected were individual liberty and security, 
equality before the law, protection of the law, private and family life, and 
freedom of thought and expression. He further articulated the ground of 
unusual treatment or punishment, on account of the terms of imprisonment 
related to both offences.55
The Court agreed with the claimant that both provisions were 
violations of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution and it modified the 
subject provisions. The Court held that the impugned provisions infringed 
upon or were likely to contravene the claimant’s fundamental rights.56 The 
main focus for the Court was the right to privacy, of which, it reasoned, 
sexual orientation was an important aspect.57 In the view of the Court:
human dignity [was] a basic and inalienable right recognized worldwide 
in all democratic societies. Attached to that right is the concept of 
autonomy and the right of an individual to make decisions for herself/
52. Jones v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (and The Equal Opportunity Commission, 
The Trinidad and Tobago Council of Evangelical Churches, The Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha of 
Trinidad and Tobago—Interested Parties), Claim No CV2017-00720, The High Court of Justice of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, delivered 12 April 2018 (unreported) [Jones v Attorney General].
53. Sexual Offences Act, 1986, Chap 11:28, Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, s 13(2). The substantive 
offence of “buggery” is in s 13(1) and carries a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment.
54. Ibid s 16(3). The substantive offence of serious indecency is in s 16(1) and carries a maximum 
penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment.
55. Sexual Offences Act, supra notes 53 and 54. 
56. In arriving at this view, the court applied a “generous and purposive” approach to the 
interpretation of the Constitution. It relied on such cases as Attorney General v Jobe, 1984 AC 689; 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher, 1980 AC 319; Reyes v R, 2002 UKPC 11; Matthew v The State, 
2004 UKPC 33; Hunter v Southman, 1984 2 SCR 145.
57. The Court relied on the Indian case Puttaswamy v Union of India, 2012 Writ Petition (Civil) 
No 494, which emphasized that sexual orientation was an essential attribute of privacy, which was 
“inextricably linked to human dignity” (Jones v Attorney General, supra note 52 at 29.)
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himself without any unreasonable intervention by the State...[S]he/he 
must be able to make decisions as to who she/he loves, incorporates 
in his/her life, who she/he wishes to live with and with whom to make 
a family...A citizen should not have to live under the constant threat, 
the proverbial ‘sword of Damocles’, that at any moment [he] may be 
persecuted or prosecuted...58
The Court further held that the State had no reasonable justification for 
this interference with the claimant’s fundamental right to private family 
life. In making that determination, the Court relied on both domestic and 
international jurisprudence. For instance, the Court referenced both the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Supreme Court of 
Canada case R v Oakes59 and highlighted that rights and freedoms can only 
be subject to “reasonable limits prescribed by law...[and] demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.”60 This is not particularly unlike 
section 13(1) of the Trinidad and Tobago Republican Constitution, which 
uses similar language: not “reasonably justifiable in a society that has 
proper respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual.”61 
The Court did not stop at Canadian jurisprudence, but also referenced 
“the position in democratic societies” by alluding for example to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in such cases as Dudgeon 
v United Kingdom,62 Norris v Ireland 63 and Modinos v Cyprus.64 Very 
important for the purposes of this article as well, the Court also referenced 
Article 17 of the ICCPR, specifically making use of the Toonen v Australia 
decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in 
which the Committee held that “it is undisputed that adult consensual 
sexual activity in private is covered by the concept of ‘privacy’” and 
continued that even if the law interfering with this right is not enforced, “[t]
he continued existence of the challenged provision…directly ‘interferes’ 
with the [individual’s] privacy…[A]ny interference with privacy must be 
proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of 
58. Jones v Attorney General, supra note 52 at 29-30.
59. 1986 1 SCR 103; SC J No. 7.
60. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
61. It is instructive to note that in Jones v Attorney General, Rampersad J, pointed out that “the 
test seems to be substantially the same between section 1 of the [Canadian] Charter and section 13 
of the [Trinidad and Tobago] Constitution with the only apparent difference being a limit which is 
reasonable and can be demonstrably justified, in the case of the former, as opposed to one which is 
reasonably justified, in the case of the latter. To my mind, there is no material difference”(ibid at p 41).
62. 1981 4 EHRR 149.
63. 1989 13 EHRR 1862.
64. 1993 16 EHRR 6853.
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any given case….”65 This resort to international standards and norms was 
explicitly acknowledged by the Court when it stated at paragraph 106 of the 
judgment that “the consolidation of rights and freedoms of the individual...
is necessarily fashioned out of local experience and culture with due regard 
being paid to the international norms in relation to individuals.”
The case of Orozco v Attorney General66 from Belize also dealt with 
the matter of sexual intimacy involving “buggery.” The claimant in that 
case challenged the constitutional validity of section 53 of the Belize 
Criminal Code,67 which states that “[e]very person who has carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature with any person or animal shall 
be liable to imprisonment for ten years.” The basis for the claim was that 
the provision interfered with the rights to human dignity, personal privacy 
and privacy of the home, private life, equal protection under the law, and 
further, was an abridgement of the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with privacy.68 Like the Jones court in Trinidad and 
Tobago, the court in Orozco turned its eyes to international jurisprudence, 
and specifically to the reasoning of the ECtHR, in holding that section 53 
had violated the claimant’s right to privacy:
In Dudgeon v UK A 45 [1981] ECHR 7525/76, the European Court of 
Human Rights stated the following in its judgment in a reference made 
to the Court by a homosexual male in Northern Ireland: 
“In the personal circumstances of the applicant, the very existence 
of this legislation continuously and directly affects his private life; 
either he respects the law and refrains from engaging - even in private 
with consenting male partners - in prohibited sexual acts to which he 
is disposed by reason of his homosexual tendencies, or he commits 
65. Toonen v Australia, Communication No 488/1992, Human Rights Committee, adopted 31 March 
1994, at paras 8.2-8.3.
66. Caleb Orozco v The Attorney General of Belize (and The Commonwealth Lawyers Association, 
The Human Dignity Trust, The International Commission of Jurists, The Roman Catholic Church 
of Belize, The Belize Church of England Corporate Body, The Belize Evangelical Association of 
Churches and United Belize Advocacy Movement—Interested Parties), Claim No 668 of 2010, The 
Supreme Court of Belize, delivered 10 August 2016 (unreported).
67. Criminal Code, 2000, CAP. 101.
68. The Constitution of Belize, 1981 (Rev 2011). Section 3 of the Constitution of Belize reads: 
“Whereas every person in Belize is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, 
that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but 
subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each and all of the 
following, namely (a)…;(b)…; (c) protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of 
his home and other property and recognition of his human dignity….” Section 6(1) reads: “All persons 
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.” 
Section 14(1) reads: “A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. The 
private and family life, the home and the personal correspondence of every person shall be respected.”
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such acts and thereby becomes liable to criminal prosecution.”69
The Court “gratefully” adopted this position in its own analysis to establish 
standing on the claimant’s part. 
In Orozco, just as in Jones, the Court adopted a purposive approach70 
to the constitutional provisions litigated by the claimant and embraced 
the view that the Constitution was a “living instrument.” Relative to the 
central role of international law, the Court remarked that the Constitution 
of Belize “[owed] its provenance to the European Convention on Human 
Rights [ECHR] which in turn was influenced by the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, [and] as such, decisions in relation to human rights issues 
have been informed by developments in international law.”71 In further 
reliance on this guidance, the Court also acknowledged that “the streams 
of domestic law and international law ought to flow in the same direction 
in establishing fundamental norms applicable to the rights conferred by the 
Constitution.”72 This approach by the Orozco Court was a clear acceptance 
of the role of core international human rights norms and values, where 
domestic constitutional and human rights were being litigated in home 
courts.
The right to privacy was one of the main planks of the analysis 
conducted by the Orozco Court. It grounded the privacy discussion in 
the notion of human dignity and called on assistance from jurisprudence 
in Canada,73 South Africa74 and Europe75 on this issue. This approach 
was entirely consistent with the Court’s consideration of the right to 
freedom of expression as a second basis for vindicating the claimant’s 
contentions. The Court considered the leading ECtHR case of Handyside 
v UK, declaring that freedom of expression was “consistent with and 
complementary to the diversity and difference of opinion contemplated 
in the [Belize] Constitution.”76 Equality was the final arm of the Court’s 
analysis, and again, international law was front and centre. The Court 
adopted the reasoning of the UNHRC in the Toonen v Australia case, 
which was litigated under the ICCPR. The result of course was a holding 
69. Orozco v Attorney General, supra note 66 at 20.
70. In this regard, the Court placed heavy reliance on the case of Nadan and McCoskar v The State, 
2005 FJHC 500, a Fijian case; and Reyes v The Queen 2002 UKPC 11.
71. Orozco v The Attorney General, supra note 66 at 24.
72. Ibid at para 59.
73. Vriend v Alberta, 1998 1 SCR 493; Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 
1999 1 SCR 497.
74. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6.
75. Dudgeon v UK, 1981 ECHR 7525/76; Norris v Ireland, 1988 ECHR 105812/83; and Modinos v 
Cyprus, 1993 ECHR 15070/89.
76. Orozco v Attorney General, supra note 66 at 34.
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that “the claimant had been discriminated against on the basis of sexual 
orientation.”77
The generosity of the courts in Jones and Orozco was, however, not 
duplicated in Tomlinson v Belize and Tomlinson v Trinidad and Tobago,78 
a twin decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), in its original 
jurisdiction.79 In this case, the claimant asserted that immigration law 
provisions in both Belize and Trinidad and Tobago violated his Treaty 
right to free movement within CARICOM,80 as those provisions expressly 
barred homosexuals from entry into those countries, subject to certain 
other provisions. In Belize, section 5 of the Immigration Act made “a 
homosexual” a “prohibited immigrant,” subject to an exemption based 
on the discretion of the Minister; in Trinidad and Tobago, under section 
8 of the Immigration Act, entry into that country was “prohibited” to 
“homosexuals,” although the Minister could allow a homosexual to 
enter as a person “passing through...under guard to another country.” 
Tomlinson’s contention was a simple one; the provisions, in their plain 
meaning, could prevent him potentially from exercising his Treaty right 
to free movement within CARICOM, in so far as Belize and Trinidad and 
Tobago were concerned.
Perplexingly one might say, the Court in basic essence, relied partly 
on the act of state doctrine to determine that since both states did not 
actively enforce the impugned provisions, there was no violation of the 
Treaty. In my view, this was an unsatisfactory use of the law, which 
ultimately resulted in a missed opportunity. The approach taken by the 
Court did not fairly and effectively resolve the substance of the claimant’s 
contention. The provisions clearly stated that “homosexuals” were prima 
77. Ibid at para 95.
78. Maurice Tomlinson v The State of Belize and Maurice Tomlinson v The State of Trinidad and 
Tobago (consolidated), 2016 CCJ 1 (OJ) [Tomlinson].
79. The Caribbean Court of Justice is a regional court that has both an original jurisdiction and 
an appellate jurisdiction. Under its original jurisdiction, it hears cases from Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) states that are signatories to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the 
Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (RTC), which is an 
international instrument governing relations between CARICOM Member States. The court’s 
original jurisdiction is, therefore, mandatory on matters arising for dispute settlement under the RTC. 
However, the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ is optional. CARICOM Member States subscribe to that 
jurisdiction if they wish to. At this point, only four CARICOM states (Barbados, Guyana, Belize, and 
Dominica) have accepted the court’s appellate jurisdiction. As recently as November 2018, Grenada 
and Antigua and Barbuda held referenda on the question of joining the CCJ’s appellate Jurisdiction, 
but both referenda results rejected that idea.  The Tomlinson cases were both decided in the CCJ’s 
original (Treaty) jurisdiction.
80. CARICOM, the Caribbean Community, was created in 1973 by the Treaty Establishing the 
Caribbean Community and its annex, The Caribbean Common Market, 4 July 1973, 946 UNTS 17, 
known as the Treaty of Cha-guaramas. That treaty was replaced in 2001 by the RTC (see note 79). 
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facie, prohibited immigrants. The simple path for the Court ought to have 
been an interpretation of the clear literal meaning of the words used in the 
alleged offending sections, followed by a straightforward analysis of how, 
if at all, this would impact the Treaty right of free movement.81 
While Trinidad and Tobago accepted that the Immigration Act in fact 
classified homosexuals as “prohibited persons,” Belize argued that only 
homosexuals who received the proceeds from homosexual behaviour, just 
as in the case of prostitutes, also covered in the section, were prohibited. 
In other words, the section was not disjunctive as in “prostitutes,” 
“homosexuals” and “any other person” living from the avails of prostitution 
or homosexuality. However, this interpretation was wholly implausible, 
and the Court resiled from a golden opportunity to pronounce on the 
flagrant and immutable discrimination that both provisions contained. 
This was a failure on the part of the Court to enforce international human 
rights norms and values in a way that it was clearly entitled to do. 
Even accepting that the Court in its original jurisdiction was not per 
se a “human rights” court, it would have been on solid ground to employ 
international human rights law and hold that the provisions in question 
violated the Treaty obligations, based on Article 217(1) of the RTC, which 
states that “The Court, in exercising its original jurisdiction under Article 
211, shall apply such rules of international law as may be applicable.” It 
is interesting to point out that in the Tomlinson decision, the Court even 
accepted that:
International human rights which have crystallized into customary 
international law form part of the common law of Trinidad and Tobago...
[and that] this human rights approach may be seen as being in keeping 
with the Preamble of the 1976 Constitution...in its affirmation that ‘the 
nation...is founded upon principles that acknowledge...the dignity of 
the human person and the equal and inalienable rights with which all 
members of the human family are endowed by their Creator.’ Section 
4 of that Constitution...recognizes and declares fundamental human 
rights and freedoms, among them the right of the individual to equality 
before the law and protection of the law, and the right of the individual 
81. Section 5 of the Belize Immigration Act in relevant part reads, “Subject to section 2(3), the 
following persons are prohibited immigrants…(a)…(e) any prostitute or homosexual or any person 
who may be living on or receiving or may have been living on or receiving the proceeds of prostitution 
or homosexual behaviour…” For Trinidad and Tobago, section 8 of the Immigration Act reads in 
relevant part, “Except as provided in subsection (2), entry into Trinidad and Tobago of the persons 
described in this subsection, other than citizens and, subject to section 7(2), residents, is prohibited, 
namely…(a)…(e) prostitutes, homosexuals or persons living on the earnings of prostitutes or 
homosexuals, or persons reasonably suspected as coming to Trinidad and Tobago for these or any 
other immoral purposes….”
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to respect for his private and family life.82
Notwithstanding this, however, the Court recoiled from holding that 
there had been a violation on the basis that it was “[u]ltimately...in the 
practical application of the legislation that...liability [was] grounded.”83 
The Court also readily took a second escape chute, by explaining that a 
separate Act in Trinidad and Tobago that dealt with the movement of skilled 
CARCOM nationals between Member States required an immigration 
officer “to permit entry...of skilled CARICOM nationals who present a 
skills certificate,” “notwithstanding any other written law.”84 Suffice it to 
say, Tomlinson was not contesting a refusal to grant him entry into Trinidad 
and Tobago based on whether he presented a “skills certificate.” Instead, 
he was contesting an immigration law that had a provision antithetical to 
the actualization of a Treaty right, notwithstanding that it had never been 
applied to him in his earlier visits to the countries concerned. Indeed, it 
was a principled legal objection.85
Ultimately, the Court hesitated to pronounce on the interpretation of 
domestic law as it was functioning in its original jurisdiction (the single 
market and economy jurisdiction), and not in its appellate jurisdiction. 
The Court could, however, pronounce on the interpretation of domestic 
law in respect of Belize (which was subject to its appellate jurisdiction). 
The Court, maybe in an effort to avoid an inconsistent ruling on the 
Trinidadian situation (where that country was not subject to its appellate 
jurisdiction), simply resolved the matter by digressing into a ruling that 
Tomlinson had not been and was not likely to be prejudiced by the alleged 
offending statutory provision. The Court resolved the case in this way 
notwithstanding the fact that it knew Mr. Tomlinson’s position—having 
given him permission in a preliminary antecedent proceeding to proceed 
to a hearing of the case on the merits.
In the case of Godwin and Deroche v The Registrar General and 
Attorney General,86 queer marriage was the touchstone issue. Both 
82. Tomlinson, supra note 78 at paras 44-45.
83. Ibid at para 46.
84. Tomlinson, supra note 78 at para 49.
85. In fact, the Court pointed out in its judgment, “Tomlinson’s complaint was not based on any 
factual refusal of entry or otherwise wrongful treatment by Belize or Trinidad and Tobago. Rather it 
centres on the allegation that the Immigration Acts of these States prohibit the entry of homosexuals. 
Tomlinson argues that the mere existence of these laws is sufficient to prejudice the enjoyment of his 
Community rights” (ibid at para 3).
86. Winston Godwin and Greg Deroche v The Registrar General and The Attorney General and The 
Minister of Home Affairs (and the Human Rights Commission and the Preserve Marriage Bermuda 
Limited—Intervenors), 2017 SC (Bda) 36 Civ (5 May 2017) (unreported) [Godwin v Registrar 
General]
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applicants had argued that Bermudian law prohibiting them from marrying 
each other as gay men was a violation of the domestic Human Rights Act, 
1981 (HRA). As a starting point of the Court’s core analysis, it held as a 
matter of English common law,87 by which it was bound, that marriage was 
an exclusive legal and emotional relationship between a man and a woman, 
thereby excluding the applicants, two men. The Court then considered 
section 15(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act88 which voided marriages in 
which  “the parties [were] not respectively male and female.” The Court 
considered further gender identifiers in the Marriage Act such as “man 
and wife” and “he or she” in section 23(4), in reference to the “parties 
to the marriage,” or “husband” and “wife” in the same section. It then 
determined that “the Marriage Act and the [Matrimonial Causes Act]...
[were] a statutory reflection of the common law impediment to same-sex 
marriage.” The Court then proceeded to conduct the HRA analysis.
The Preamble to the HRA reveals its purposes as giving domestic 
law effect to international human rights conventions and protecting 
fundamental rights and freedoms found in the Bermuda Constitution. The 
Act makes express reference to international human rights instruments, the 
UDHR and the ECHR, which is a clear recognition of international human 
rights norms and rules.89 The Court considered section 2(2) of the HRA, 
which speaks specifically to the prohibition of discrimination based on 
“sexual orientation,” among other grounds. In advancing the human rights 
violation analysis, the Godwin court turned to South African jurisprudence 
dealing with the ills of discrimination against queer persons in society. 
The Court cited a decision of the South African courts, Minister of Home 
Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another,90 and relied on an excerpt from 
the judgment of Sachs, J. in that case, that:
The exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits and responsibilities 
of marriage, accordingly, is not a small and tangential inconvenience 
resulting from a few surviving relics of societal prejudice destined to 
evaporate like the morning dew. It represents a harsh if oblique statement 
by the law that same-sex couples are outsiders, and that their need for 
87. Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee 918860 L.R. 1 P.&D. 130. At page 133 Lord Penzance formulated 
it this way—“I conceive that marriage…for this purpose [may] be defined as the voluntary union for 
life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.”
88. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1974:74, Laws of Bermuda. The section reads in material part, “A 
marriage…shall be void on the following grounds only, that is to say—that it is not a valid marriage 
under the Marriage Act 1944; (a)…; (b)…; that the parties are not respectively male and female.”
89. It is important to note however that Bermuda is in a politically different position to the other 
countries dealt with in this article, as it remains an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and not an independent State.
90. 2005 ZACC 19 (Constitutional Court of South Africa).
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affirmation and protection of their intimate relations as human beings 
is somehow less than that of heterosexual couples. It reinforces the 
wounding notion that they are to be treated as biological oddities, as 
failed or lapsed human beings who do not fit into normal society, and, 
as such, do not qualify for the full moral concern and respect that our 
Constitution seeks to secure for everyone. It signifies that their capacity 
for love, commitment and accepting responsibility is by definition less 
worthy of regard than that of heterosexual couples.91
This conclusion was crystallized by the Godwin Court, having further held 
that the registrar general was in fact providing a service in the issuance 
of marriage permits and was, therefore, subject to the anti-discrimination 
provisions of the HRA under section 31(1).92 
In an effort to both blunt and reverse the ground-breaking consequences 
and effect of the Godwin decision on Bermudian marriage laws, the 
Government of Bermuda enacted the Domestic Partnership Act, 2018 
(DPA).93 The critical provision was section 53, which emphatically—and 
highly unusually—made express reference to the decision of the Court in 
Godwin:
Clarification of the law of marriage 
53. Notwithstanding anything in the Human Rights Act 1981, any other 
provision of law or the judgment of the Supreme Court in Godwin and 
DeRoche v The Registrar General and others delivered on 5 May 2017, 
a marriage is void unless the parties are respectively male and female. 
(Emphasis added.)
The challenge to section 53 came in Ferguson v The Attorney General.94 
The applicant was successful in the Bermudian High Court, leading to an 
appeal to the Court of Appeal of Bermuda (Attorney General v Ferguson),95 
and culminating again in victory for the respondent/claimant.
91. Godwin v Registrar General, supra note 86 at 33.
92. The section provides that it applies to “…(a) an act done by a person in the course of service 
of the Crown—[i]  in a civil capacity in respect of the Government of Bermuda; or [ii] in a military 
capacity in Bermuda; or (b) to an act done on behalf of the Crown by a statutory body, or a person 
holding a statutory office, as it applies to an act done by a private person.”
93. Domestic Partnership Act, 2018:1, Laws of Bermuda.
94. Roderick Ferguson v The Attorney General (and OUTBermuda, Maryellen Jackson, Gordon 
Campbell, Sylvia Hayward-Harris and The Parlor Tabernacle of the Vision Church of Bermuda v The 
Attorney General), 2018 SC (Bda) 46 Civ (6 June 2018).
95. The Attorney General for Bermuda v Roderick Ferguson, OUTBermuda, Maryellen Jackson, 
Gordon Campbell, Sylvia Hayward-Harris and The Parlor Tabernacle of the Vision Church of 
Bermuda, Civil Appeal Nos 11 and 12 of 2018, The Court of Appeal of Bermuda, delivered 23 
November 2018 (unreported) [Ferguson v Attorney General].
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At the Court of Appeal, the Court held that the revocation provision 
found in section 53 of the DPA was enacted for “a mainly religious 
purpose” to assuage the anti-gay marriage lobby group Preserve Marriage 
Bermuda (PMB).96 This, therefore, brought the Court’s analysis squarely 
to discrimination on the basis of religion and creed. In conducting its 
analysis, the Court relied on human rights jurisprudence from Canada and 
the United Kingdom. Relying on McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited,97 the 
Court of Appeal adopted the view that: 
The promulgation of law for the protection of a position held purely 
on religious grounds cannot...be justified. It is irrational...But it is also 
divisive, capricious and arbitrary. We do not live in a society where all 
people share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one religion...
cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in general 
law than the precepts of any other...So, the law must firmly safeguard 
the right to hold and express religious belief, equally firmly, it must 
eschew any protection of such belief’s content in the name only of its 
religious credentials. Both principles are necessary conditions of a free 
and rational regime.98
This was consistent with the Court’s application of the Supreme 
Court of Canada case Mouvement Laique Quebecois v Saguenay,99 where 
McLachlin C.J. explained that the obligation that resides with the state 
to maintain, protect and preserve religious neutrality emerges from an 
evolving interpretation of what it means to have freedom of conscience 
and religion. In that connection, it behoves the state not to engage in any 
way that favours or hinders its neutral role on such matters. This, the Chief 
Justice explained, was a hallmark of a free and democratic society, which 
places an obligation on the state to motivate citizens to engage freely in 
public life irrespective of their beliefs. This accordingly enhances and 
gives strength to the multicultural nature of society. So, where the state 
is required to protect everyone’s freedom of religion and conscience, it 
must encourage the harmonious and non-conflictual expressions of both 
96. As the court pointed out,“Since 2015 opposition to same-sex marriage has been coordinated 
by Preserve Marriage Bermuda (PMB), a religious lobby created to oppose same-sex marriage. It 
has done so through petitions, demonstrations and court interventions as well as lobbying Members 
of Parliament. Its petition, which attracted over 9,000 signatures said: ‘We agree that marriage in 
Bermuda should remain defined and upheld as a special union ordained by God between a man and a 
woman.’ Other similar statements appeared on its website…PMB has the right to believe but it does 
not have the right to impose its beliefs on anyone else.” Ibid at para 34.
97. 2010 EWCA Civ 880.
98. McFarlane v Relate Avon, 2010 EWCA Civ 880 at paras 24-25.
99. 2015 2 SCR 3.
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believers and non-believers in public life, such that one or the other does 
not become a detriment to any individual in the society. 
The Bermudian Court of Appeal also applied the Canadian case of R 
v Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,100 for the proposition that a law that infringed 
religious freedom was inconsistent with any fundamental right that 
protected such a freedom. As Dickson J noted in Big M Drug Mart:
Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of coercion and 
constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom 
means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the rights of others, no one is forced 
to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or conscience...  In my view, the 
guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion prevents the government 
from compelling individuals to perform or abstain from performing 
otherwise harmless acts because of the religious significance of those acts 
to others. The element of religious compulsion is perhaps somewhat more 
difficult to perceive (especially for those whose beliefs are being enforced) 
when, as here, it is nonaction rather than action that is being decreed, but 
in my view, compulsion is nevertheless what it amounts to.101  
In the context of Bermuda, section 8(1) of the Constitution was inexorable 
to the approach of the Court:
Except with his consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of 
his freedom of conscience, and for the purposes of this section the said 
freedom includes freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change 
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others, and both in public or in private, to manifest and propagate his 
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.102
It is little wonder therefore that the Court of Appeal sought grounding 
in the precedents it applied. Its logic was evidently a reflection of core 
international principles. As international human rights jurisprudence 
declares, while a state may possess the power to enact legislation that 
limits an individual’s right to a given freedom, pursuant to the limitation 
provisions of such international instruments, such limitation of any 
person’s rights can only be justified when, taken together with the 
protection of the rights and reputations of others, it is deemed necessary; 
or to meet the requirements of national security, public safety, order, 
morality or health; or for the general welfare of a democratic society. Such 
limitations are also required by international principles to be prescribed by 
100. 1985 1 SCR 295.
101. R v Big M Drug Mart, 1985 1 SCR 295 at paras 95 and 133.
102. Schedule 2 to the Bermuda Constitution Order, 1968, section 8(1).
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law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary in democratic societies.103 
Any restrictions or limitations that fall outside of these parameters are, 
therefore, a violation of international law principles. 
So, in the context of the reason for the DPA, as determined and 
pronounced by the Court of Appeal, while the law may have been 
“useful” to the objectives of PMB, or desirable to the likely majority of 
the Bermudian Christian population, that did not make it “necessary” in 
a democratic society. This was an opportunity at vindication for the right 
of same-sex couples in Bermuda to marry, which the Court of Appeal 
grasped with obvious clarity.
The final case for consideration is McEwan v Attorney General.104 
This is a judgment from the CCJ, involving a group of young men who 
were charged with wearing female attire in contravention of the Summary 
Jurisdiction (Offences) Act.105 The appellants claimed  that the provision of 
the Act material to this charge was ultra vires the Constitution of Guyana. 
The violations argued by the appellants were their right to equality and 
non-discrimination guaranteed under Article 149 of the Constitution 
and their right to freedom of expression pursuant to Article 146. They 
further argued that the provision violated Articles 40 of the Constitution 
(protection of the law) on account of the vagueness of the term “improper 
purpose,” which made it impossible for the citizen to guide their conduct 
and Article 144 (fair hearing), based on an apprehension of bias in certain 
remarks by the presiding magistrate about the need for the appellants to 
seek God and turn to religion to correct their behaviour.
In the lead judgment of the Court, the President offered a very poignant 
and inspired rendering of the importance of recognizing and respecting 
differences within societies. Holding the provision unconstitutional, 
Saunders P. cut to the heart of the matter:
Difference is as natural as breathing. Infinite varieties exist of everything 
under the sun. Civilised society has a duty to accommodate suitably 
differences among human beings. Only in this manner can we give due 
103. UNHCR Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/23/40 General Assembly; 17 April 2013 at 
paras 28-29.
104. Quincy McEwan, Seon Clarke, Joseph Fraser, Seyon Persaud, Society Against Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination (SASOD) v The Attorney General of Guyana, 2018 CCJ 30 (AJ) [McEwan 
v Attorney General].
105. Laws of Guyana, Cap 8:02, s 153(1)(xlvii). The section reads—“Every person who does any 
of the following acts shall, in each case, be liable to a fine of not less than seven thousand dollars…
(i)…(ii)…(xlvii) being a man, in any public way or public place, for any improper purpose, appears in 
female attire, or being a woman, in any public way or public place, for an improper purpose, appears 
in male attire; or (xlviii)…”
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respect to everyone’s humanity. No one should have his or her dignity 
trampled upon, or human rights denied, merely on account of a difference, 
especially one that poses no threat to public safety or public order. It is 
these simple verities on which this case is premised. 
In holding the provision to be a violation of the right to be protected 
from discrimination and of the right to free expression, the Court adopted 
the link between equality and dignity from the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, quoting from the Advisory Opinion on Proposed 
Amendment to the Political Constitution of Costa Rica related to 
Naturalization106 where it stated that:
The notion of equality springs directly from the oneness of the human 
family and is linked to the essential dignity of the individual. That 
principle cannot be reconciled with the notion that a given group has the 
right to privileged treatment because of its perceived superiority. It is 
equally irreconcilable with that notion to characterize a group as inferior 
and treat it with hostility or otherwise subject it to discrimination in the 
enjoyment of rights which are accorded to others not so classified.107
The Court further relied on principles of equality and non-
discrimination from the CEDAW108 Committee,109 as well as jurisprudence 
from several jurisdictions, among them, Canada,110 India111 and Belize.112 
In holding a violation of the right to be free from discrimination, the Court 
ruled that section 153(1)(xlvii) had a “disproportionately adverse impact 
on transgendered persons…[as it] infringes on their personal autonomy 
which includes both the negative right not to be subjected to unjustifiable 
interference by others and the positive right to make decisions about 
one’s life…[The section also] reinforces stereotyping…[and] conduces 
to the stigmatization of those who do not conform to traditional gender 
clothing…thus enabling the state to unleash its full might against them…
[This] cannot…be reasonably justified.”113
106. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, 19 January 1984, Series A, No 4.
107. McEwan v Attorney General, supra note 104 at para 65.
108. UN General Assembly resolution 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1249 p 13, 
online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html> [https://perma.cc/8JV8-GQM9] or 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cedaw.pdf> [https://perma.cc/2VY3-LAZD]
109. General Recommendation No 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women at 22.
110. Law v Canada, 1999 1 SCR 497; R v Oakes, 1986 1 SCR 103; Andrews v Law Society of British 
Columbia, 1989 1 SCR 143.
111. National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and Others, 2014 4 LRC 629; 2012 Writ 
Petition (Civil) No 400.
112. Roches v Wade, 2004 Action No 132, The Supreme Court of Belize (delivered 30 April  2004).
113. McEwan v Attorney General, supra note 104 at para 72.
TWAIL Meets Caribbean Queer Rights Jurisprudence— 29
Intersections with International Human Rights Law
In a similar vein, relative to the violation of the right to free expression, 
the Court was equally resolute and unqualified it its protection of the 
appellants by asserting that:
No one should have to live under the constant threat that, at any moment, 
for an unconventional form of expression that poses no risk to society, 
s/he may suffer such treatment. But that is the threat that exists in 
section 153(1)(xlvii). It is a threat particularly aimed at persons of the 
LGBTI community. The section is easily utilised as a convenient tool 
to justify the harassment of such persons. Such harassment encourages 
the humiliation, hate crimes, and other forms of violence persons of the 
LGBTI community experience. This is at complete variance with the 
aspirations and values laid out in the Guyana Constitution…114
The McEwan Court also took the opportunity to strike down section 
153(1)(xlvii) of the Act, as it determined that the phrase “improper purpose” 
was too vague to be constitutionally sound. This was entirely consistent 
with international human rights law, which establishes that in order for 
a human right to be justifiably fettered, the impediment must firstly be 
one that is “prescribed by law.” A restriction is prescribed by law115 not 
only if it has a basis in domestic law per se—but also it is required to be 
accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effect.116 A law 
is foreseeable if it is formulated with enough precision so as to enable an 
individual governed by it to properly regulate their conduct.117 The Court 
in Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom118 also asserts that an Act is 
prescribed by law where the effects of that law are not so vague as to render 
them unpredictable. Further, as determined in Pinkney v Canada,119 an Act 
is prescribed by law where it contains adequate safeguards to protect the 
citizen from arbitrariness. This was precisely the holding of the McEwan 
court when it ruled that:
a penal statute must meet certain minimum objectives if it is to pass 
muster as a valid law. It must provide fair notice to citizens of the 
114. Ibid at para 79.
115. The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991); 
Silver and Others v The United Kingdom, 1983 Series A no 61; Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke 
Media B and others v The Netherlands, App no 39315/06 (ECtHR 22 November 2012).
116. Amann v Switzerland App no 27798/95 (ECHR, 16 February 2000) ); Liberty and Others v The 
United Kingdom App no 58243/00 (ECtHR 1 July 2008); Savovi v. Bulgaria App no 7222/05 (ECtHR 
27 November 2012).
117. Malone v Commissioner of Police, 2 August 1984; Kruslin v France, 1990 series A no 176 A; 
Huvig v France, 1990 Series A no 176 B.
118. App No 25594/94, 25 November 1999, 2000 30 EHHR 241, ECHR 199-VIII. 
119. Pinkney v Canada, Merits, Communication No 27/1977, UN Doc CCPR/C/14/D/27/1977, IHRL 
2845 (UNHRC 1981), 29 October 1981, Human Rights Committee [UNHRC]; Al-NAshif v Bulgaria 
App no 50963/99 (ECtHR, 20 June 2002).
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prohibited conduct. It must not be vaguely worded…A law should not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement…The fact that no 
one can say with certainty what an improper purpose is or what male 
or female attire looks like, leaves transgendered persons in particular 
in great uncertainty as to what is not allowed. And to aggravate that 
injustice, it gives law enforcement officials almost unlimited discretion 
in their application of the law.120
On all major counts in this case, therefore, the Court followed and enforced 
international human rights law norms and rules.
IV. TWAIL and Caribbean Queer Rights Jurisprudence
From the discussion of the cases above, and the evidence provided, it 
is apparent that the courts do not share the neo-colonial/anti-imperialist 
narrative championed by TWAIL scholars. Nor do the courts’ decisions 
reflect the anti-hegemonic rhetoric addressed by Smith & Kosobucki121 
and Massad122 or the animus of the population relative to the situation in 
the Cayman Islands as reflected in Vlcek’s analysis.123 To the contrary, 
I would suggest that what has emerged is a passionate and decisive 
embrace and adoption of globalist international human rights norms and 
values, diligently and artfully brought to bear on an evolving Caribbean 
articulation of queer rights. 
The integration by Caribbean courts of norms and guidance from 
wider international legal sources, or the jurisprudential solidarity that their 
queer rights opinion canvass, does not in my view diminish the integrity 
or indigeneity of the decisions in these Caribbean cases, neither does it 
totally assay the creative aspirations of the courts to craft a principled 
jurisprudential queer rights/human rights philosophy. Indeed, from 
the evidence offered, what the courts appear to do is to build their own 
framework of analysis based on the domestic constitutional and statutory 
human rights provisions (as in the Human Rights Act in the case of Bermuda), 
thereafter establishing the terrain for principled analysis and explication, 
with reference not only to domestic and regional jurisprudence but also 
to that which is extra-regional and international as well. This is an effort 
to advance a new blended enunciation for the protection of human rights 
(in particular, queer rights), which depicts not the usual anti-colonialist, 
TWAIL-like fervour and critique of international human rights law, but is 
rather an amalgamation of reasonable international human rights norms 
120. McEwan v Attorney General, supra note 104 at paras 80 and 84.
121. Smith & Kosobucki, supra note 2.
122. Massad, supra note 3.
123. Vlcek, supra note 4.
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and principles, and  a respect for local conditions. This is somewhat similar 
to what Woessner  describes as a mapping out of “a different conception 
of human rights altogether, one that looks not just at the clean centres of 
cosmopolitan power, but at the messier margins of provincial suffering.”124 
In other words, the courts are not simply rejecting international norms on 
equality, liberty and entitlement to human dignity, because of notions of 
imperialism versus parochialism or “core” versus “periphery” in relation 
to human rights, but are instead justifying and applying these norms in a 
contextual manner, not based purely on cultural values, but on fairness, the 
rule of law, and democratic values. 
What this indicates is that there is a discernible judicial propensity to 
construct a framework of analysis that is not symptomatic of the precepts 
of the TWAIL approach, which triggers and reinforces historical and 
international political economy considerations of colonial “capture,” but 
rather to construct a framework that is based on pragmatism, objective 
reality and fundamental notions of human equality and dignity. This is 
enhanced by the courts’ domestication of these wider and more fundamental 
epitaphs of the rule of law, applied to the factual circumstances and 
imperatives before them. Consider, for instance, that prior to McEwan 
a person in Guyana could be arrested, charged, detained in custody, 
convicted and sentenced, simply for wearing a piece of clothing, more 
commonly worn by the opposite sex, that a police officer determined was 
for an “improper purpose.”  What the Court did in that particular case was 
to wield a tour de force of objection to such arbitrariness and violation 
of an inherent entitlement to self-determination, thereby establishing a 
“normative” expectation in the law, that was not previously in existence. 
Now, while men dressing in perceived women’s clothing in public might 
not have been deemed to be a culturally acceptable course of conduct 
in the Caribbean prior to, or even with the McEwan decision the Court 
acceded to a legally higher calling—the protection of the rights to free 
expression and equality before the law that are essential to human dignity, 
particularly when no issues of public safety, public indecency or public 
health are implicated. 
As TWAIL has it, international human rights law comes with what 
Parmar refers to as “ideological and historical baggage.”125 If its concern is 
the suffering of particularly situated human beings, then, as a methodology, 
124. Martin Woessner, “Provincializing Human Rights? The Heideggerian Legacy from Charles Malik 
to Dipesh Chakrabarty,” in JoseI-Manuel Barreto,ed, Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: 
Critique, History and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing,2013) at 68.
125. Pooja Parmar, “TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry,” (2008) 10:4 Intl Community L Rev 363 at 
369. 
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the goals that it sets out to achieve “must be followed in ways that lead 
to conceptualisations that enable emancipatory interpretations and not 
replication of the past.”126 This objective of “emancipatory interpretation” 
is what the courts seem to be embarking on, as an incremental disowning 
of hegemonic-based conceptualizations of things such as “buggery” and 
restrictions on marriage for example, which in the Caribbean have their 
roots and philosophical underpinnings in colonial history. By taking 
decisions such as those in Orozco, Ferguson and McEwan, the courts 
are engaging in a discourse of emancipation. They are formulating their 
own narratives of queer rights in their jurisprudence, through a process 
of organic evolution, which symbolizes liberation from the proverbial 
European colonial rule, rather than Eurocentric or Western imposition. 
To that extent, in choosing not to uphold rules and laws that are vestiges 
of this colonial era, and in safeguarding and vindicating queer rights, the 
Caribbean courts themselves are embarking on an emancipatory decolonial 
project. 
In this context, I am, therefore, critical of the TWAIL approach to 
international human rights law, bearing in mind that it represents notions 
of the unactualized poignancy of domestic Third World culture in the 
promulgation of international human rights norms, as well as notions of 
resistance to “neo-colonial” and “imperialist” capture.127 It is my argument 
that equality-seeking rights, in particular queer rights, in so far as the 
Caribbean is concerned, clearly create a tension with core elements of 
TWAIL. The question now becomes this:  is there room for accommodation 
in TWAIL of equality-seeking queer rights in the Caribbean? Or, does the 
approach of the Caribbean courts ostensibly resolve the conflict with what 
amounts to a decisive distancing from judicial thinking that would reflect 
or image the TWAIL-like methodological approach to international human 
rights norms?
But what are norms and how are they to be understood? For convenience 
I borrow from Judge, et al. who explain that:
norms are “a model or standard accepted (voluntarily or involuntarily) 
by society or other large group, against which society judges someone or 
something.” Norms depend on community perception, acceptance, and 
enforcement…[Further], norms [are] “informal social regularities that 
individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of 
126. Ibid at 368.
127. See Okafor & Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining,” supra note 29; Okafor, “Newness,” supra note 25; 
Okafor, “International,” supra note 28; Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7; Mutua, “Ideology,” supra 
note 33; Anghie, “Imperialism,” supra note 38; Anghie, “Globalization,” supra note 26; Rajagopel, 
“Counter-Hegemonic,” supra note 46. 
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duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”’,…[T]he 
term “norm” refers to “both behaviour that is normal, and behaviour that 
people should mimic to avoid being punished…Thus although norms are 
outside of legal rules, they are important for legal governance.”128
Against this backdrop, I advance the proposition that international 
human rights norms should be the “standards of human behaviour that 
are accepted and expected”; the “model or standards accepted”; the social 
“regularities” that individuals should feel obligated to follow; and the 
behaviours that should be “mimicked”; where human freedom, dignity 
and equality or concerned. I argue that relative to the protection of human 
rights, such norms should not be predicated on nuanced cultural practices 
in and of themselves, without more, but should instead be viewed through 
the prism of whether or not such cultural and nuanced local practices 
reflect standards of human behaviour that embody freedom, equality and 
dignity. In other words, the objective standard should not be determined 
by a domestic majoritarian or religious view, pronouncement, or approach 
to a given course of conduct; rather, it should be determined according to 
whether or not enforcing such a view, pronouncement or approach, would 
be offensive to or inconsistent with “regularities” of human freedom, 
equality and dignity. Without this objective standard, I argue, there is 
the perennial risk (as I understand the resistance and political modus of 
TWAIL) that where certain Third World customs, cultures or practices are 
inconsistent with what are labelled or perceived as Western/First World 
international “human rights norms,” there would be some perception of 
neo-colonial imposition. The case law explored in this article does not 
support that TWAIL proposition, without more. Instead, what appears to 
be happening is that Caribbean courts are employing external laws and 
norms from the international human rights arena to evolve domestic ones. 
This is not a careless or reckless imposition of such external laws and 
norms, but rather, a context-driven, considered, rational and purposeful 
application of such laws and norms.
In the cases of Orozco, Jones, Ferguson and Godwin, one of the most 
forceful objections came from religious organizations, which essentially 
argued that “buggery” and gay marriage were not culturally acceptable, 
based on religious precepts that were “Caribbean norms.” Indeed, in 
Ferguson, as noted above, the Court explicitly found that the government 
acted out of religious motivation. In such a scenario, the question then 
becomes, should these cultural/religious norms prevail over international 
128. Elizabeth F Judge & Tenille E Brown, “Pokemorials: Placing Norms in Augmented Reality,” 
(2017) 50 UBC L Rev 971 at  991-992.
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human rights norms of freedom, dignity and equality? The inescapable 
answer in my view is a resounding no. That is precisely the view taken by 
the courts in the decisions examined above. 
One cannot help but underscore the irony of the “TWAILesque” 
approach of these religious organizations in their claim that permitting gay 
marriage and legalizing consensual “buggery” in private were offensive and 
disrespecting impositions of a neo-colonial “rescue” or “capture.” These 
religious/cultural norms were handed to Caribbean peoples by colonial 
rulers hundreds of years ago, and actually reflected colonial values at the 
time. Those former colonial “masters” have since changed their own laws 
on these issues; determined enclaves of Caribbean societies still continue 
to claim ownership of these antiquated laws on the basis of culture and 
religion, to defend against primacies of equality and non-discrimination. 
This is no different, for instance, from the irony in the perennial claim that 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries should abandon Her Majesty’s Privy 
Council in the United Kingdom and adopt their own final appellate court, 
in order to preserve local culture and protect against foreign culture, yet, 
as recent as November 2018, the populations of two Caribbean countries 
(Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada), rejected the adoption of the appellate 
jurisdiction of the CCJ as their final appellate court, in favour of the Privy 
Council, in separate referenda.129 Symons et al. aptly capture this irony, 
in their discussion on polarization in international human rights sexuality 
law:
Opponents generally argue that legal treatment of sexuality should be 
determined at a national level and not mandated by international human 
rights instruments. Opposition is typically framed as a defense of 
sovereignty that resists imposition of western cultural values and identity 
categories. Ironically, strongly anti-colonialist governments in Asia, 
Africa, and the Caribbean now defend laws that were often introduced 
under the British colonial regime and the ‘tradition’ referred to is often 
the legacy of 19th century missionary teachings…130
So, can TWAIL be reconciled in its counter-hegemonic, imperialist 
political scholarly agenda, with the equality-giving queer rights 
jurisprudence of the Caribbean courts as examined in this article? I argue 
that there is space for accommodation based on core precepts of the rule 
of law and democracy. It could never be fairly or seriously argued that 
129. “CCJ Disappointed with referenda Results in Grenada and Antigua and Barbuda,” Caribbean 
360.com (7 November 2018), online: <http://www.caribbean360.com/news/ccj-disappointed-with-
referenda-decisions-in-grenada-and-antigua-barbuda> [https://perma.cc/55WH-GRVZ] 
130. Jonathan Symons & Dennis Altman, “International Norm Polarization: Sexuality as a Subject of 
Human Rights Protection” (2015) 7:1 International Theory 61 at 65.
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“TWAILers” are antithetical to these core precepts and legal propositions. 
The variance comes where consideration is given to how international law 
norms and values are “normalized” across the international sphere, vis-à-
vis domestic values and norms. The rule of law, as former United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Anan explains:
refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation 
of powers, participation in decision making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.131
Concomitantly, democracy contemplates “…a system of justice and 
equality among people, as a process that recognizes the diversity in society 
and allows constant criticism of phenomena, relationships and processes. 
Democracy is at the same time both acquisition and instrument of freedom, 
justice and equal opportunities in society.”132 In this connection, if the goal 
of both international human rights norms and TWAILers are justice and 
equality, then there cannot be much divergence, irrespective of whatever 
nomenclature is used, particularly where domestic constitutions create 
and enshrine these rights and norms. These domestic constitutions are 
typically organic, coming out of a process of consultation and very often, 
express consent through suffrage. As such, these constitutions must be 
taken to be the will of the people in the given jurisdiction in which they 
bear supremacy over all other laws. 
In the cases discussed in this article, the various rights were anchored 
primarily in constitutional instruments. All the rights litigated were as 
common as rights come, namely freedom of expression, privacy, and 
equality in the law, and before the law. None of these are inconsistent with 
respect for democracy and the rule of law. Thus, the legitimacy offered or 
ascribed by the courts in the enforcement of these rights cannot be rooted in 
social preferences and idiosyncrasies that are attached to public opinions, 
expectations or preferences, or socio-cultural proclivities, but ought, and 
should be about the more omniscient values. As long as it is those core 
values that are being vindicated, then there ought not to be any viable 
131. The Secretary General, Report on The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post 
Conflict Societies, UNSCOR, 2004 UN Doc S/2004/616 at para 6.
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space for divergence between equality-seeking queer-rights interests and 
those who defend the TWAIL approach to international human rights 
norms and values.   
Conclusion
In the few years that queer rights have begun to become a feature of 
Caribbean human rights jurisprudence, Caribbean courts have been able 
to render a few amazing and ground-breaking decisions. From protecting 
gay marriage in Bermuda, to the destruction of the criminalization of 
“buggery” in Trinidad and Tobago and Belize, the earth has moved in 
Caribbean human rights jurisprudence. While these decisions are confined 
to domestic jurisdictions and may not have binding application across the 
entire region as a result of the varying constitutional arrangements that 
exist, persuasive precedents have nonetheless been set. It would be hard to 
envision major divergences in other parts of the Caribbean as similar cases 
are eventually brought to other Caribbean courts. 
From this research, it is evident that Caribbean courts have thus far 
shown a willingness to be open-minded in reaching for fairness, by heavily 
engaging not only with queer rights jurisprudence and general human rights 
perspectives from a variety of extra-regional jurisdictions, but also from 
international bodies and institutions. This indubitably signifies a trajectory 
of channelling the Caribbean stream of queer rights to flow in unison, as 
far as is possible, with the stream of rights accepted and crystalized in 
international human rights law. Importantly, courts in the region are not 
thrusting into a realm of creative judicial activism of their own. Instead, 
they appear to only be bringing, as necessary, international human rights 
norms to bear on Caribbean judicial law-making where queer rights are 
concerned, so that a “made in the Caribbean” outcome which prioritizes 
equality and non-discrimination can be achieved.
What this tells us is that the rhetoric of counter-hegemony, resistance, 
West versus East, or North versus South, championed by TWAIL approaches 
to international law, are not fundamentally taking flight in Caribbean courts 
so far, nor do these approaches seem to be a part of the path that these courts 
are forging on queer rights. Instead, the courts are engaging persuasively 
and deliberately with these “outside” principles, breathing life into basic, 
core human rights norms and values that are already inherent in Caribbean 
constitutional regimes and laws. Many of these constitutions, in fact, are 
modelled in the images of international treaties such as the ICCPR and 
the UDHR, and as such, it is not as if these rights never existed. To the 
contrary, what is unfolding is an evolving articulation of these rights in a 
new discourse of queer rights in the Caribbean.
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That is why, even though the approach of the courts to queer rights 
has not been shown to amplify or imbibe the TWAIL methodological 
perspectives, there can still be common ground between both the Caribbean 
jurisprudence on queer rights and TWAIL, as both operate within constructs 
that validate basic ideas of the rule of law and democracy. The rule of law 
dictates that there be respect for human dignity and for equality before 
the law, while democracy protects the entitlement of each individual to 
enjoy the opportunities of self-determination and self-actualization as 
every citizen, as long as public safety, order or morality, and public health 
are preserved. That is essentially what the courts in the Caribbean have 
thus far said in relation to queer rights, and that is what can also be said 
to be reasonable, fair and just. It is a leap of faith, that has great potential 
for Caribbean peoples, in a socio-cultural environment where fear and 
misunderstanding of differences abound. 
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